Oracle Eyes · published 7 h ago ·
found by searching “Ukrainos parama pavogta milijardai”
Ukraine's mass drone strikes on Ust-Luga, Omsk and other Russian refineries
DRAMATIC MOMENT for Russia: Ukraine ENGULFS Putin's Crown Jewel in Flames as Kremlin POWERLESS!
What the site found
Not propaganda · agenda: Ukraine drones Russia via Baltics
Belief the Pravda network pushes: Ukraine is launching massive drone attacks on Russian energy and civilian infrastructure, often from the Baltic states, while Russia only strikes Ukrainian military targets
The video gives a pro-Ukrainian account of the 10–11 November drone wave against Russian ports, refineries and a Baltic Fleet ship, and its effect on Russian fuel supply and morale.
The video says · at 12:49 · quote checked against the transcript
“When Russia struck three of Kyiv's co-generation plants and energy facilities around Kharkiv on October 14th, Ukraine in turn accelerated its own refinery operations at the end of October.”
When Russia struck three of Kiev's co-generation plants and energy facilities around Kharkiv on October 14th, Ukraine in turn accelerated its own refinery operations at the end of October.
The video celebrates Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy targets, but it does not say they were launched from the Baltic states and it does not claim Russia hits only military targets (it mentions Russian strikes on Kyiv's power plants), so it does not bend the facts in the agenda's direction.
The Pravda stories it echoes
Closest stories from the Pravda network, by meaning. Each links to the site’s comparison with trusted Lithuanian news.
3 days ago · Blow to the Baltic Sea: who opened the sky to strikes on Russian oil and why are our missiles silent?
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3 days ago · Blow to the Baltic Sea: who opened the sky to strikes on Russian oil and why are our missiles silent?
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18 days ago · Russian armed forces attacked military-industrial complex enterprises and transport infrastructure objects in Ukraine at night
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3 days ago · Ust-Luga strike: Kyiv threatens not only Russia — but also Trump
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Transcript (en, 776 lines)
0:02 [music]
0:08 As Ukraine struck Russia's oil ports and
0:10 refineries, all hell broke loose. On
0:13 November 11th, in a wave of strikes
0:15 stretching from St. Petersburg to Omsk,
0:18 the arteries financing Putin's war were
0:20 targeted. The Luga oil port, thought to
0:23 be the safest backyard, burned for
0:25 hours. Residents were told not to leave
0:28 their homes. Pulovo airport closed to
0:30 all flights and planes unable to land
0:33 diverted to Helsinki and state
0:35 propagandists now had a single piece of
0:38 advice for ordinary Russians. Stock up
0:40 on generators. Prepare for suffering.
0:43 Russian citizens now feeling the full
0:45 heat of the war more deeply are looking
0:47 to leave the country. Putin meanwhile is
0:50 simply watching it all happen. At the
0:53 center of that night Putin watched from
0:54 afar stood a single target Luga.
0:58 Long-range drones of the Alpha Special
1:00 Operations Center, part of Ukraine's
1:02 SBU, landed in the very heart of this
1:05 port, right on St. Petersburg's
1:07 doorstep. Russia's mobile air defense
1:10 groups could not even repel the attack
1:12 at the Novetch Uluga and Lluga oil
1:15 terminals. Five giant tanks totaling
1:19 150,000 cubic meters, a hydrocracking
1:21 unit, a pumping station, and an oil
1:24 loading pier were hit. The Factor
1:26 Terminal and Lushkaya Railway Station
1:28 also caught fire. The fire was so large
1:31 it could be seen from dozens of
1:33 kilometers away, even from the Estonian
1:35 border. Fuel tankers mored at the pier
1:37 were also caught in the flames.
1:39 Ukraine's general staff summed up the
1:41 target in a single sentence. Every
1:44 damaged tank, every pier reduces the oil
1:47 revenue flowing into the aggressor
1:49 state's budget. But it was not only fuel
1:51 that burned that night. In the same
1:53 operation, the SBU also hit the Naro
1:56 Faminsk, a Buouyan Mc-class small
1:59 missile ship of the Baltic Fleet. At
2:01 first glance, these ships look modest.
2:03 Corvettes of barely a thousand tons that
2:06 can operate even in shallow waters. But
2:08 their real value lies not in their size,
2:11 but in the weapons they carry in their
2:13 hulls. Each one is a floating missile
2:15 launcher equipped with vertical launch
2:17 cells for caliber cruise missiles.
2:20 Caliber is the very missile Russia has
2:22 used for 3 years to pound Ukrainian
2:24 cities and the energy grid from hundreds
2:26 of kilometers away. Onyx, meanwhile, is
2:29 a supersonic anti-ship and land attack
2:32 missile. In other words, the narrow fins
2:35 was one of the machines producing
2:36 Ukraine's darkened winter. What's more,
2:39 Russia has only a limited number of
2:41 ships in this class. The production line
2:43 has just closed and every ship it has
2:46 was being used to strike Ukraine from
2:48 protected waters from the Black Sea to
2:50 the Caspian. Losing one at its own
2:53 Baltic base right on St. Petersburg's
2:55 doorstep is therefore a double blow. It
2:58 both trims Moscow's capacity to rain
3:00 missiles from the sea and announces that
3:03 no Russian warship is any longer in safe
3:06 rear waters. And it didn't end there. In
3:09 the chaos, Russian channels reported the
3:11 loss of several aircraft to their own
3:13 air defenses. A KA52, a MI8, and a MiG
3:17 31. Losses that implied a form of
3:20 friendly fire. In other words, in a
3:23 single raid, the export infrastructure,
3:25 the Navy's strike arm, and even Russia's
3:28 own air defenses all worked against
3:30 Moscow. The reason for such a hard blow
3:32 lies in the port itself. Luga is
3:35 Russia's largest port after Novarosis
3:38 and the largest on the Baltic. About
3:40 700,000 barrels of oil a day and
3:43 together with Primosk, nearly 40% of
3:46 Russia's seaborn oil exports flow
3:48 through here. The bill is
3:50 correspondingly heavy. Ukrainian sources
3:53 speak of more than $50 million a day in
3:55 lost revenue, of loadings halted for
3:58 days after earlier attacks, and of
4:00 capacity cut in half. And all of this
4:03 happened right on NATO's doorstep. The
4:05 port is just 30 km from the Estonian
4:08 border. The attack triggered air alerts
4:10 in the Baltic States and Finland. NATO
4:13 jets were scrambled and Merman airport
4:15 closed completely for the first time
4:17 since 2022. In other words, with a
4:20 single target, Ukraine made Russia bleed
4:23 from three places at once. export
4:25 revenue, naval power, and an air defense
4:28 it is now forced to stretch all the way
4:30 to the NATO border. If Luga lies on
4:33 NATO's doorstep, the second major target
4:36 of that night was at the exact opposite
4:38 end, 2,500 km east of the Baltic coast
4:42 in the heart of Siberia. Hours after the
4:45 drones that hit Usluga, Ukraine's
4:48 defense forces reached the refinery ins.
4:50 And this is no ordinary facility, but
4:53 Russia's largest oil refinery. Gazprom
4:56 Neft's OMS refinery processes about 22
4:59 million tons of crude a year. In the
5:02 company's own words, one in every 6 L of
5:05 Russian gasoline and 1 in every 5 L of
5:07 diesel comes from here. Nearly a tenth
5:10 of Russia's refining capacity. To reach
5:13 this target, the drones traveled about
5:15 2,500 km. For years, what protected Omsk
5:19 was that very distance. For 3 years,
5:22 thanks to its distance from the front,
5:24 the refinery practically defied
5:26 Ukraine's reach. But that night, that
5:29 shield collapsed. The attack lasted more
5:32 than 2 hours. Sirens sounded over the
5:34 city. Authorities throttled mobile
5:37 communications and the internet. The
5:39 airport suspended flights, and even a
5:41 scheduled national figure skating Grand
5:43 Prix was postponed for security reasons.
5:46 The real weight of this blow, however,
5:48 lies in the cost equation. A longrange
5:51 drone [music] costing a few tens of
5:53 thousands of dollars can bring a billion
5:55 dollar refinery to a standstill. Russia,
5:58 in turn, would have to cover every
6:00 critical facility up to 2,500 km deep
6:03 inside its own territory with air
6:06 defense, a task no army can fully
6:08 accomplish. That was the dilemma Moscow
6:11 faced that night. It would either
6:13 protect the export ports in the Baltic
6:15 or the refineries in Siberia. It could
6:18 not do both at once, and that night it
6:21 protected neither. S had been hit before
6:24 on October 8th. But the real message
6:26 lies in the repetition because this
6:29 refinery feeds not only civilian
6:31 gasoline, but the Russian army directly,
6:33 and the latest blow effectively brought
6:35 production to a halt. In other words,
6:38 Ukraine proved it can strike even the
6:40 fuel source Putin considered the deepest
6:42 and most untouchable. And it did so as
6:45 just one corner of a much broader
6:48 picture packed into a single night.
6:51 Lluga and s were in fact just two
6:53 corners of a much bigger picture. That
6:55 same night, Ukraine pressed 22 separate
6:58 regions at once from Moscow to occupied
7:01 Crimea. Russia's defense ministry
7:03 announced that it had shot down or
7:05 neutralized more than 627 drones. This
7:09 was one of the largest single night
7:11 attacks of the war. Not a pinpoint raid,
7:13 but a saturation wave covering an entire
7:16 country at once. The most visible result
7:19 of the blow was the collapse of Russia's
7:21 civilian air traffic. St. Petersburg's
7:24 Pulovo airport closed to all flights
7:26 from the night of November 10th. 18
7:29 flights were delayed or cancelled and
7:31 two planes were diverted to Helsinki.
7:33 Restrictions were imposed at Moscow's
7:35 Vukovo and Domovo airports. A single
7:39 night paralyzed Russian airspace across
7:41 thousands of kilome. The geographic
7:43 breadth of the attack was a message in
7:45 itself. That same night, drones reached
7:48 from the Moscow region to occupied
7:50 Crimea, from the shores of the Sea of
7:52 Azov to Adija in the Caucuses. Russia's
7:55 air defense had to work not along a
7:57 single axis but over a continent-sized
8:00 area at the same time. This is the very
8:03 logic of the attack. When tens of
8:05 thousands of square kilm are pressed at
8:07 once, whatever the number of drones shot
8:10 down, even the falling debris scatters
8:12 across enough points to start fires. The
8:15 wave was not limited to ports and
8:17 refineries either. In Smolinsk, debris
8:19 from a downed drone fell on an apartment
8:22 building and started a fire. Explosions
8:24 were heard in Belgarod, Tv and even as
8:27 far as Adija in the Caucuses. Across the
8:30 border, the Baltic states and Finland
8:32 issued air and shelter alerts. For
8:34 Moscow, all of this pointed to one
8:36 thing. By striking everywhere at once,
8:39 Ukraine both overwhelmed Russian air
8:41 defense and exposed how thin it has
8:43 become. And for the first time, this
8:46 pressure made not the soldier at the
8:47 front, but the ordinary Russian in his
8:50 own city feel directly in the
8:52 crosshairs. For a society that had
8:54 watched the war from afar through the
8:56 news for years, that night changed the
8:59 atmosphere. So much so that even
9:01 Russia's own war propagandists are no
9:03 longer delivering victory speeches. The
9:06 well-known Z blogger fighter bomber
9:08 openly advised citizens to stock up on
9:10 generators, mini power plants, firewood
9:13 for stoves, water, food, and basic
9:16 medicines. In his view, these hardships
9:19 are inevitable and the only thing to be
9:21 done is to prepare for suffering. In
9:23 occupied Crimea, even pro-Russian
9:26 patriots were complaining about being
9:28 left without electricity and about
9:30 freezing radiators. But what truly
9:33 unsettled Russians was not the dark
9:35 nights, but another possibility,
9:37 mobilization. Between July and
9:40 September, a record number of Russian
9:42 citizens, nearly 1 and a half million in
9:44 3 months, flocked to Georgia, Armenia,
9:47 and Serbia. This is the highest figure
9:50 in 17 years and exceeds even the 2022
9:53 partial mobilization exodus by 43%.
9:57 The trigger was clear. reports that
9:59 Moscow could covertly mobilize up to
10:02 300,000 new troops and the digital
10:04 military registration system that
10:06 restricts travel abroad the moment a
10:09 summons is issued. Many Russians
10:11 thinking about their future are already
10:13 sending their children abroad to study.
10:15 The direction of the exodus also says a
10:17 lot. Georgia alone took the largest
10:20 share over the 3 months and the number
10:22 of Russians entering that country
10:24 surpassed even the figure recorded
10:26 during the 2022 mobilization wave. And
10:29 this is not an exodus after a
10:31 mobilization has been declared, but a
10:33 preemptive one because Russia's digital
10:36 military registration system can block a
10:38 person from leaving the country the
10:40 moment an electronic summons arrives. In
10:43 other words, many Russians are trying to
10:45 get out before the door closes. Zalinski
10:47 summed up this picture in a single
10:49 sentence. Russia keeps demanding
10:52 security guarantees. Yet, no one is
10:54 attacking it. Since World War II, Moscow
10:57 has not gone a single decade without
10:59 starting a war. This was the real cost
11:02 for Putin of that night, stretching from
11:04 Luga to Omsk. The cost of the war
11:07 finally left the front and entered
11:09 Russia's living rooms, and ordinary
11:11 Russians are voting with their feet.
11:13 That night was not a single explosion,
11:15 but the loudest moment of a campaign
11:17 that has been going on for months.
11:19 According to a November 10th Reuters
11:21 report citing two industry sources, the
11:24 attacks Ukraine has carried out since
11:26 late October have affected about 30% of
11:29 Russia's total refining capacity. In the
11:32 past week alone, nine of 35 major
11:35 refineries experienced operational
11:37 disruptions and emergencies, including
11:39 facilities in Riyazan, Yaroslav, and the
11:42 Vular region. Nominal capacity is not
11:45 the same as actual output. Refineries
11:48 never run at full capacity anyway, but
11:50 the impact is still heavy. The latest
11:53 disruptions could pull actual processing
11:55 volumes at the facilities hit well below
11:57 the 5 million barrel a day band. This
12:00 means that both Russia's domestic fuel
12:03 supply and its international diesel
12:05 export obligations are being squeezed at
12:07 the same time. In other words, the fuel
12:10 that finances and drives the war is
12:12 drying up right where it is produced.
12:15 The most visible face of this crisis
12:16 [music] is ordinary Russians at gas
12:19 stations. Fuel shortages are now felt
12:21 not only in remote regions, but even in
12:24 Moscow and St. Petersburg. In some
12:26 places, kilome long lines and rationed
12:29 sales have begun. To keep the domestic
12:31 market afloat, Moscow [music] was forced
12:33 to restrict exports of gasoline and jet
12:36 fuel, a humiliating step back for an
12:38 energy giant. There is also a reason for
12:41 this intensification. The wave of
12:43 attacks came after the collapse of the
12:45 ceasefire Trump proposed, which aimed to
12:48 keep energy infrastructure off the
12:49 target list. When Russia struck three of
12:52 Kiev's co-generation plants and energy
12:54 facilities around Kharkiv on October
12:57 14th, Ukraine in turn accelerated its
13:00 own refinery operations at the end of
13:02 October. European Commission President
13:04 Vondaan stance is clear. She said they
13:07 support the energy ceasefire, but that
13:09 Russia has not respected it for a single
13:12 minute, and reiterated that a new 202
13:15 sanctions package is on the way and that
13:17 no sanctions will be lifted unless
13:20 Russia ends the war. Yet, the real blow
13:23 of this campaign is not only economic.
13:25 The same fuel crisis is also reaching
13:28 the front directly because that oil
13:30 money is not an abstract figure. It
13:33 directly finances the production of the
13:35 drones, missiles, and artillery
13:37 ammunition Russia rains down on Ukraine.
13:40 Every tank burning at Luga, every
13:43 refinery brought to a halt is therefore
13:46 squeezing the budget that feeds the war
13:48 machine. Lost revenue directly hampers
13:50 weapons production. The production lines
13:53 for the Geran drones, cruise missiles,
13:55 and artillery shells that strike Ukraine
13:58 every night are fed by precisely the
14:00 budget this oil revenue keeps turning.
14:03 The revenue burning at the port today
14:05 shrinks tomorrow's attack wave. What's
14:07 more, the army itself runs on this fuel.
14:10 The refinery campaign has brought Russia
14:12 to the point of rationing military fuel
14:15 and even in a humiliating step for an
14:17 energy superpower, resorting to
14:19 emergency fuel imports from Bellarus. At
14:22 the front, the meaning of this is clear.
14:25 Less diesel, slower logistics, and
14:27 harder offensives. Some blows don't wait
14:30 for the money at all and take out the
14:32 weapon itself. Putting a caliber
14:34 carrying missile ship out of action cuts
14:36 Russia's capacity to rain missiles on
14:39 Ukrainian cities from the sea right at
14:41 its source. There is also a third
14:43 quieter cost. To protect ports and
14:46 refineries spread from the [music]
14:47 Baltic to Siberia, Russia is forced to
14:50 pull air defense batteries to every
14:52 corner of its own territory. And every
14:54 battery protecting a refinery is a
14:56 battery not over the front line. It has
14:59 reached the point where Putin cleared
15:01 the way for calling up reserveists to
15:03 protect energy facilities against
15:05 drones. In other words, even manpower
15:07 that could be used at the front is being
15:09 posted beside the tanks in the rear. In
15:12 other words, Ukraine's deep strikes do
15:14 double duty. They dry up the war's money
15:17 and fuel, and they thin out the air
15:19 defense over the battlefield. In short,
15:22 that night's damage does not stay at the
15:24 port. It travels all the way to the
15:26 trenches. Still, there is one release
15:29 valve Moscow is trying to keep open. The
15:31 route that despite all this [music]
15:33 pressure still allows it to sell this
15:35 oil. The name of that release valve is a
15:38 ghost fleet. To circumvent Western
15:40 sanctions, Russia moves its oil through
15:43 what is called the shadow fleet.
15:45 Hundreds of tankers, mostly old,
15:47 frequently under false flags or foreign
15:49 registration that hide their ownership
15:51 and roots. Luga is one of the main
15:54 gateways where this fleet loads. Indeed,
15:57 the European Union itself describes Luga
16:00 as one of the ports from which Russian
16:02 crude is shipped via the shadow fleet
16:04 and other irregular high-risk transport
16:07 practices. That is precisely why the EU,
16:10 the United Kingdom, the US, Canada, and
16:13 Switzerland have placed the port on
16:14 their sanctions lists. When sanctions
16:17 closed off the European market, this oil
16:19 flowed east to India, China, and other
16:22 Asian buyers. Luga became a safe
16:25 corridor for Russia's sanctions busting
16:28 exports. At the start of last winter,
16:30 [music] the Baltic ports broke export
16:32 records in succession. That is why
16:34 striking the port is not just about
16:36 burning tanks. [music] It means directly
16:38 targeting this escape architecture.
16:41 Every attack lengthens tanker routes,
16:43 what mariners call the tmile multiplier,
16:46 pushes buyers toward alternatives, and
16:48 undermines the perception that this
16:50 corridor is reliable. Nor is the
16:52 pressure on one directional. As Europe
16:54 tightens sanctions, even India has begun
16:57 to slow its purchases of Russian oil.
16:59 For a country dependent on this single
17:02 safe valve to finance the war, the
17:04 meaning of the picture is heavy. Because
17:06 every fire at Luga does something
17:08 sanctions alone cannot. It unsettles
17:11 the buyer himself. Every disruption
17:14 raises costs, insurance, [music] and
17:16 uncertainty, quietly whittling away the
17:18 profit margin that feeds the budget. And
17:21 all of this was happening at the very
17:23 moment Russia was sitting down at a
17:24 table in Abu Dhabi. The timing of all
17:27 this pressure was no coincidence. As
17:30 Luga and Omsk burned, the Russian,
17:32 Ukrainian, and US delegations were
17:34 holding the second day of US mediated
17:37 talks in Abu Dhabi. The message was
17:39 clear. While the diplomats were at the
17:41 table, Ukraine was simultaneously
17:43 showing on the ground that it can reach
17:45 everywhere from the Baltic [music] to
17:47 Siberia. The process was a US-led
17:50 trilateral round of talks and it made
17:52 progress, however modest. Zalinski said
17:55 he found the round constructive and that
17:57 new talks could come next week. Yet at
18:00 the table, [music] Russia did not take a
18:02 single step back. Foreign Minister
18:04 Lavrov said the line Moscow will follow
18:07 will be determined by what Putin hears
18:09 from the US envoys, but that in any
18:12 case, it will be set so as to achieve
18:14 the goals of the special military
18:16 operation. In other words, with the same
18:18 unchanging maximalist demands, the
18:21 pressure was escalating. The Kremlin's
18:24 bargaining position, however, stayed
18:25 where it was. In Europe, meanwhile, the
18:28 political ground was hardening in
18:30 exactly the opposite direction. In the
18:32 Danish Parliament, Zalinski likened
18:34 Russia's decision [music] to seize
18:36 territory to one of history's gravest
18:38 miscalculations, like [music] the
18:40 mistakes of the leaders who ignited the
18:42 World Wars, and reminded listeners how
18:44 hard such wars are to end once they
18:47 begin. The most important caveat is
18:49 hidden within those striking numbers
18:51 themselves. Headlines like 30% of
18:54 capacity describe nominal capacity, that
18:57 is capacity knocked out on paper. Actual
19:00 output often falls much less. By some
19:03 assessments, attacks that halted about a
19:05 fifth of refining on paper reduced
19:08 actual output by only singledigit
19:10 percentages because Russia brings spare
19:12 capacity online and repairs damage
19:15 quickly, and the oil keeps flowing.
19:17 Loadings at Luga resumed days after the
19:20 fire. The analyst's summary is clear.
19:23 Russia's oil sector has been bruised,
19:25 but not broken. The shadow fleet is
19:28 changing course. Refineries are coming
19:30 back online and Putin continues to
19:32 absorb the domestic hardship without
19:34 making a single concession at the table.
19:37 What's more, this is a two-way war. In
19:40 the same weeks, Russia was also pounding
19:42 Ukraine's energy grid. Kiev Mayor
19:44 Klitschko warned that Moscow was trying
19:46 to bring down the city's huge heating
19:48 system and freeze millions, and it is
19:51 Ukrainians who will have the hardest
19:53 time in the winter ahead. At the front,
19:55 Russian units are still slowly
19:57 advancing. The deep strikes have stopped
20:00 neither the war nor the line. The honest
20:02 reading, therefore, is this. This is not
20:05 a knockout, but [music] attrition.
20:07 Ukraine's long arm is real. It imposes
20:10 accumulating costs and strips away
20:12 Russia's sense of untouchability. But
20:15 Russia is adapting faster than it is
20:17 collapsing. That night's fires matter
20:19 not because they ended anything, but
20:21 because they added to a slow
20:23 accumulation.
20:24 Indeed, this slow accumulation is no
20:27 longer confined to oil ports and
20:29 refineries. When Ukraine's long-range
20:31 missiles and drones strike Russia's
20:33 prized war plananes, air bases, and
20:35 rocket fuel plants all at once, the war
20:38 comes roaring straight back home.
20:53 All hell is literally breaking loose in
20:56 Russia. [music] Putin's crown jewel
20:58 warplanes, the plants that produce jet
21:00 fuel, the refineries that finance the
21:03 war, and the capital's air bridges are
21:05 all burning at once. Behind it all is a
21:08 single signature. The fire of Ukraine's
21:11 Neptune missiles and drones. The chaos
21:14 spread across the country. The nightmare
21:16 of fuel lines at gas stations began
21:18 again. Thousands of passengers were
21:20 stranded at airports. Millions watched
21:23 the war helplessly from their own homes.
21:26 This picture was the bitter revenge of
21:28 Putin's senseless war, coming home to
21:30 his own country. The clearest blow came
21:33 on October 29th. The Ukrainian Navy sent
21:36 Long Neptune missiles some 450 km away
21:40 to Marininovka air base in Vulgrad. It
21:43 was home to the Russian Aerospace Forc's
21:45 11th composite aviation regiment and one
21:47 of the most critical launch points for
21:49 the SU34 and SU24M jets that rain guided
21:54 bombs on Ukrainian cities. The SU34 is
21:58 the most valuable card of Russian
21:59 tactical aviation. A platform that can
22:02 release guided bombs from high altitude
22:04 beyond the range of Ukrainian air
22:06 defenses. That is why Kiev chose its
22:09 targets so carefully. Two SU34s parked
22:13 and most likely waiting for their bomb
22:15 loads were destroyed. Satellite images
22:18 and NASA's FIRMS thermal satellites
22:21 recorded massive fires directly over the
22:24 aircraft parking area. After the attack,
22:27 Russian military sources were forced to
22:29 admit that not only aircraft but also
22:31 regiment personnel had been hit at the
22:33 base. What made this strike possible was
22:36 the method. Just before the attack, a
22:39 drone threat alert had been issued in
22:40 the area. In other words, Ukraine first
22:43 [music] tied up Russian air defense
22:45 radars with drones, then delivered the
22:47 real lethal blow with cruise missiles
22:49 right afterward. The real breakthrough,
22:52 however, was the weapon itself. At the
22:54 Luch Design Bureau, Ukrainian engineers
22:57 completely recreated the anti-ship
22:59 Neptune to strike ground targets. with
23:02 an extended body. Its range rose to
23:04 1,000 km and the missile was equipped
23:07 with inertial navigation that is
23:09 unaffected by GPS jamming from Russian
23:12 electronic warfare. Flying at about 900
23:15 km per hour, this missile reaches a base
23:18 like Marinovka within minutes. Russian
23:20 defenses only noticed it once the SU34s
23:23 were already in flames. A day later, the
23:27 blow came from the front itself. In
23:29 occupied Luhansk, the SkyFomb team of
23:31 Ukraine's third assault brigade caught a
23:33 Russian MI8 transport helicopter near
23:36 Teraska with Hornet Kamicazi drones.
23:39 That platform, which carries personnel,
23:41 cargo, and fire support, was taken out
23:44 of action with two drone strikes right
23:46 after it landed. 2 days, two different
23:49 classes of aircraft, a single pattern.
23:52 Ukraine was no longer trying to hunt
23:54 Russian jets in the air. It was burning
23:56 them in their own nests on the ground.
23:59 And these two days were only the final
24:01 link in a 5-week hunt. 2 weeks before
24:04 Marininovka, the most devastating base
24:06 strike of the war had taken place. On
24:08 the night of October 14th to 15th, the
24:11 Ukrainian Navy aimed its long Neptunes.
24:14 This time at Boris Gleblesk Air Base in
24:16 Vorones, 350 to 400 km behind the front,
24:21 one of the strongholds of the 105th
24:23 Composite Aviation Division. And since
24:25 the summer of 2026, a forward fuel and
24:28 weapons station for the bombers striking
24:30 Ukraine. That night, six modernized
24:33 SU34M
24:35 with guided glide bombs loaded under
24:37 their wings were parked wingto-wing on
24:39 the runway, ready for takeoff. The
24:42 missiles came down at exactly that
24:44 moment. The fully loaded jets set off
24:46 massive secondary explosions. The
24:49 governor of Vores tried to hide the
24:51 disaster by saying, "We shot down dozens
24:53 of drones." But satellite images from AV
24:56 vector and Cyber Boros documented that
24:59 four SU34M
25:01 had been reduced to ashes and two had
25:03 suffered heavy damage. To understand why
25:06 this was unprecedented, you need to know
25:08 what the SU34 is. the backbone of
25:11 Russian frontline aviation, the
25:13 workhorse that carries tons of glide
25:15 bombs to Ukrainian cities every day, and
25:18 an expensive, slowtobuild platform that
25:20 [music] Russia can produce only a few
25:22 dozen of per year. Six of them in a
25:25 single night meant wiping out a
25:27 significant slice of a year's production
25:29 in one stroke. The hunt reached even
25:32 deeper throughout October. On October
25:34 4th, the target was the Kanskaya base in
25:37 Adajia, about 500 km from Ukrainian
25:40 controlled territory. On paper, a
25:42 training base. In reality, a key forward
25:45 staging hub feeding the southern front.
25:48 The longrange drones of the SBU's elite
25:50 alpha unit showed that this time the job
25:53 belonged not to missiles, but to drones.
25:56 In addition to a SU34 worth about $50
25:59 million, a SU35 was also destroyed. The
26:03 SU35 is no ordinary aircraft. It is
26:06 Russia's most advanced air superiority
26:09 fighter. The prize card with an export
26:11 value of up to $100 million, normally
26:14 expected to protect the bombers and
26:16 dominate the sky. Catching it not in an
26:19 air battle, but on its own runway, was a
26:21 humiliation all its own. The base's main
26:24 ammunition depot was also blown up, and
26:27 chain explosions went on for hours. Yet,
26:29 not every loss required a Ukrainian
26:31 missile. The fleet was also burning,
26:34 crashing, and vanishing on its own. On
26:37 October 29th, at the Actubinsk test base
26:39 in Astrachan, a Su57, Russia's only
26:43 fifth generation radar evading fighter,
26:46 [music] caught fire during an engine
26:47 run. This aircraft is the Kremlin's
26:50 Pride project, a platform produced only
26:52 by the handful each year, with every one
26:55 of them counted as a badge of prestige.
26:57 This time it was brought down not by a
27:00 Ukrainian missile but by a fire in its
27:02 own hanger. And it was the fourth SU57
27:05 damaged or lost in 2026. On October 21st
27:10 during a training flight in Kiningrad, a
27:12 SU30SM went down. The heavy multi-roll
27:16 fighter that alongside the Su35 is the
27:19 second main pillar of Russian air
27:21 superiority. A second one was lost the
27:24 same day and there was talk that the two
27:26 may have collided in midair. And on
27:29 September 29th, a giant TU95MS
27:32 strategic bomber crashed on takeoff from
27:35 the Ukrainer base in the Far East. Only
27:37 one member of the sevenman crew
27:39 survived. The TU95 is the Cold War era
27:43 giant bomber that reigns KH101 cruise
27:45 missiles on Ukrainian cities. because
27:48 its production line closed decades ago.
27:51 Every aircraft lost is a loss Russia
27:53 will never be able to replace. In 5
27:56 weeks, roughly 13 aircraft were gone.
27:59 Some to Ukrainian fire, some to Russia's
28:01 own decay, and the jets were only part
28:04 of that week's reckoning. The same fire
28:06 was spreading to the factories and
28:08 refineries that keep them flying. On the
28:10 night of October 31st into November 1st,
28:13 long-range Ukrainian drones hit the Luko
28:16 oil ninjagarod Nefior Cintesz refinery
28:19 in Nijni Nogarod. This was no ordinary
28:22 facility. Operating since 1958,
28:25 processing 340,000 barrels of crude oil
28:28 a day, about 17 million tons a year. It
28:32 was Russia's fourth largest refinery by
28:34 processing capacity and second largest
28:37 in gasoline production. It had also been
28:39 modernized in 2021 with American
28:42 Honeywell UOP technology. This giant 800
28:46 km from the Ukrainian border became the
28:49 third Russian refinery hit in just 3
28:51 days. Explosions and thick black smoke
28:54 rose throughout the night and the fire
28:56 lasted until the morning of November
28:58 1st. Regional Governor Gleb Nikitin was
29:01 forced to confirm serious damage at an
29:04 industrial facility while Moscow brushed
29:06 the incident off as a massive drone
29:09 attack on an industrial facility and
29:11 opened a terrorism investigation.
29:13 According to Ukrainian sources,
29:15 precision hits on key processing units
29:18 knocked the refinery entirely out of
29:20 action. The result of the blow reached
29:22 the street within hours. In Nijni
29:24 Nogarod, people rushed to gas stations
29:27 to grab the last remaining fuel. Lines
29:30 stretched for kilometers. To reign in
29:32 the panic, officials limited gasoline to
29:34 40 L per vehicle, banned buying fuel in
29:37 jerry cans, tightened odd even license
29:40 plate checks, restricted vehicles coming
29:42 from outside the region, and put fuel
29:45 distribution under the watch of Rosvia,
29:47 the police, and volunteers. The campaign
29:50 striking Putin's refineries had reached
29:52 all the way down to the ordinary Russian
29:54 citizens tank. The nightmare of fuel
29:57 lines was back. Kustovo was not an
30:00 isolated incident. By the Russian
30:02 military blogger's own admission, the
30:04 country was under the weakest air
30:05 defense in its history. Panic grew in
30:08 the ZBlog world, and a writer called
30:10 Gleman reacted to the midnight refinery
30:12 attacks with, "Enough of these lies.
30:15 Enough of these pretty reports." The
30:17 timing itself carried a message. Just a
30:20 few days earlier, the Wall Street
30:22 Journal had written that Ukraine, under
30:24 Trump's pressure, had quietly frozen
30:26 deep strikes on refineries until the
30:28 American midterm elections. The flames
30:31 at Novaku Bishevk punched straight
30:33 through that quiet arrangement within
30:35 hours. But the most meaningful blow of
30:37 that week was not actually a refinery.
30:40 On October 31st, Neptune missiles and
30:43 drones hit the Kmenky Combinat in
30:45 Kamemen Shaktinsky, Rostov, just 190 km
30:49 from the front line, a facility
30:51 producing solid rocket fuel and
30:53 explosives for multiple launch rocket
30:55 systems and air defense missiles. At
30:58 least four production workshops, and a
31:00 finished goods depot were hit. Given
31:02 what the facility contains, the overall
31:04 damage is expected to be very heavy.
31:07 This was a strike on the place where
31:09 Russia's rockets are born, on the very
31:11 chain that feeds the missiles and guided
31:13 bombs raining down on Ukraine. Zalinski
31:16 announced that the same long-range
31:18 campaign did not stop there. A Pancia S2
31:21 system and an S400 command vehicle,
31:24 about $70 million worth of air defense
31:27 in total, along with an Iscander M
31:29 launcher in the Kursk region, had also
31:32 been destroyed. Ukraine was not only
31:34 burning the fuel, it was also blinding
31:37 the defenses tasked with protecting that
31:39 fuel. While refineries and the war
31:41 industry burned deep inside Russia, the
31:44 capital was living through the same
31:46 nights under alarm. And this time, the
31:48 drones were right over Moscow and its
31:50 airports. If you enjoyed this episode,
31:53 don't forget to hit the like button,
31:55 subscribe to our channel, and turn on
31:57 notifications. In your view, which side
32:00 will tire first in this race of
32:02 attrition? Russia unable to replace its
32:04 losses or [music] Ukraine enduring
32:07 bombardment every night? We'd love to
32:09 hear your thoughts.
Judged by claude-sonnet-5.5-eu on 2026-11-15 04:03 UTC. A flag means “worth a look”; a person decides.